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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of social interactions at the work floor for understanding gender pay 
differences in the EU. Using data from the Fourth European Working Conditions Survey, we find 
that sex similarity of subordinate and supervisor decreases the pay disadvantage for women in 
non-managerial occupations, though working for a female boss is associated with a lower wage 
than working for a man. This may point at a „discrimination-for-pay‟ effect. Female workers can 
avoid part of the discrimination against them by working for a woman and accepting lower pay. 
And when they face stronger discrimination in the situation of a male supervisor, they are 
„bribed‟ by being offered a higher salary. Different results are obtained for managerial workers 
where sex similarity of worker and superior actually puts women at a further disadvantage. In 
addition to effects of vertical gender segregation, we examine whether wage formation is 
influenced by the proportion of women per sector (i.e., horizontal segregation), but find only 
weak support for the so-called social bias theory. Our main message is that while the traditional 
human capital model tends to study the wage formation process in isolation, gender pay 
differentials can also be seen as a social phenomenon, stemming from social interactions in labor 
markets. 
1. Introduction 
Women in EU countries earn on average about 15 percent less than men (European Commission, 
2007). Though the precise magnitude of discrimination is hard to identify, we should realize that 
the potential costs of gender pay differences are substantial, in particular the costs associated 
with underutilization of human resources in the economy. For example, as a reaction to the 
gender pay gap, women may decide to supply less labor, they may invest less in human capital or 
they could be discouraged in their career development. 
                                                 
1
 We thank Isabel Grilo and Outi Slotboom for helpful comments. 
 2 
There is a large literature on gender pay differences. Economists typically use human capital 
theory and estimate versions of the Mincerian wage equation with a gender dummy, controlling 
for differences in individual characteristics of workers. For example, part of the gender pay gap 
is attributed to differences in work experience; female employees are on average somewhat 
younger than male workers (e.g., because women exit the labor market earlier) and for a given 
age women typically have less work experience because of career interruptions (e.g., due to 
maternity leave) (Hunt and von Restorff, 2004). In addition to differences in endowments (such 
as educational attainment or work experience), gender pay differences may arise because of 
differences in the returns to these endowments, for example, when women have lower returns to 
education than men. The latter effects correspond to the unexplained part in the well-known 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (e.g., Beblo et al., 2003). 
It seems however unnatural to study the phenomenon of the gender pay gap by only looking at 
workers in isolation, ignoring potentially important social interactions. Sociologists typically 
stress the role of networks for understanding gender pay differences. For example, according to 
social network theory (or social bias theory), gender pay differentials diminish as the ratio of 
females to males in an occupation increases (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Anderson et al., 2007). 
Such group interactions can take place at various hierarchical levels. First, the gender 
composition of non-managerial workers may influence wage formation. It is found that wage 
levels are substantially lower in predominantly female professions (Macpherson and Hirsch, 
1995). Second, pay levels may be affected by the gender of their superiors. Here the question is 
what happens to the status of a subordinate group when some of its members attain positions 
from which they might reduce gender inequality (Cohen and Huffman, 2007). In addition to 
these group dynamics, direct interactions between superior and subordinate of (dis)similar sex 
may influence wage formation processes (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003). The present paper examines 
the role of both direct and group interactions in explaining wage formation in the EU, combining 
insights from sociology and the labor economics literature.  
The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, we make use of a large representative and 
rich data set (Fourth European Working Conditions Survey) covering residents of 31 countries
2
. 
Hultin and Szulkin (1999) have emphasized the importance of replicating research on the gender 
wage gap within an international context. With a few exceptions (Arulampalam et al., 2007), 
existing studies focus on one particular country or region, even though it can be expected that 
there are cross-country differences (Rubery et al., 2005; Beblo et al., 2003). Next to these 
country effects, we are able to control for a large range of individual, organizational and 
occupational characteristics often associated with the wage formation process. Second, we focus 
on the role of direct interactions between supervisor and subordinate within organizations. In 
doing so, we distinguish between different hierarchical levels, including both non-managerial and 
managerial workers. To our knowledge only one other study has examined such direct 
interactions within the specific context of Germany (Hunt and von Restorff, 2004)
3
. Recently, 
Cohen and Huffman (2007) have investigated the impact of the representation of women in 
management on wage formation in certain industries, but they did not link workers and managers 
in their actual work setting. According to Hunt and von Restorff (2004) there has been limited 
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attention for the role of the direct supervisor in explaining the gender wage gap because most 
data sets do not include information on the characteristics of supervisors. Our data set not only 
allows for the identification of supervisors and their characteristics, it also enables us to link 
supervisors to individual workers within the same organization.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes and discusses the 
literature on the gender wage gap, focusing on the role of social interactions in labor markets. In 
Section 3 we describe the data and outline our empirical methodology. In Section 4 the results 
are presented and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Explaining the Gender Pay Gap 
There is a vast number of studies investigating the reasons behind the pervasive gender wage 
gap. There are several recurring themes in the explanation of gender differences in wages. Most 
well-known and widely accepted is the human capital perspective where lower female wages are 
linked with differences in acquired qualifications (Becker, 1985; Mincer, 1974). Other supply 
side factors that are said to depress women‟s wages relative to those of men include a lower 
number of working hours, career interruptions, less labor market experience, a different 
educational background (Ostroff and Atwater, 2003) and lower negotiation skills (Babcock and 
Laschever, 2003)
4
.  
Labor markets show occupational segregation, which can be divided into horizontal and vertical 
segregation. In terms of horizontal segregation, differences in the characteristics of the jobs of 
women and men account for, at least part of, the wage differences. Several studies show that a 
greater share of women in a job, organization or top management tends to depress wages of both 
female and male employees (Huffman and Velasco, 1997; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987; 
England et al., 1988; Tomaskovic-Dewey, 1995). Gattiker and Cohen (1997) find that, even in 
female dominated occupations, men make more money than women. They refer to this 
phenomenon as within-job discrimination
5
. Given a certain level and type of knowledge and 
skills, women may select themselves into lower-paid jobs because of their preference for work 
environments with supportive and team-oriented rather than competitive and outcome-oriented 
cultures (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), the latter of which are often related with higher 
performance and rewards (Mueller and Plug, 2004). An alternative explanation would be the 
presence of evaluative discrimination (Hultin and Szulkin, 1999), where the work of women is 
valued less, thereby lowering the value of the work of individuals within female-dominated 
organizations or jobs (Ostroff and Atwater, 2003). Here it is not the gender of the worker, but 
rather stereotypes and roles attributed to women and men that explain performance ratings and 
pay. Especially in case of information asymmetry, managers may rely upon gender stereotypes 
and base (expected) productivity on group membership (Holzer and Neumark, 2000).    
In terms of vertical segregation, we see that women are still underrepresented at higher 
hierarchical levels within organizations, often referred to as the glass ceiling effect or allocative 
discrimination (Hultin and Szulkin, 1999). Vertical segregation may directly affect the wages of 
women who occupy a certain position and have problems climbing the „organizational ladder‟, 
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but it may also indirectly affect the wages of other female employees who lack (access to) female 
superiors who can represent their interests. According to Hultin and Szulkin (2003), individual 
wages are to some extent determined by the interaction between supervisors and subordinates.  
Sex similarity may strengthen the social ties between female managers and female subordinates 
(Hultin and Szulkin, 2003). According to Brewer and Kramer (1985) individuals tend to 
discriminate in favor of their own „category‟. This means that female managers have a tendency 
to positively evaluate the performance of female workers. Indeed, gender dissimilarity between 
supervisors and subordinates has been negatively associated with supervisor performance ratings 
(Tsui and O‟Reilly, 1989). The hypothesis that gender pay gaps are smaller when female 
employees have female managers is based on the managerial power assumption. This is the 
assumption that (female) managers are not only willing, but also able to act autonomously in 
their own interest or in that of their female workers (Cohen and Huffman, 2007). Women are 
often less central in the network than men and may therefore receive less support for their 
arguments and requests for resources (Hultin and Szulkin, 1999). Several studies show that a 
greater representation of women at higher levels of the organization narrows the gender wage gap 
(Hultin and Szulkin, 1999; Shenkav and Haberfeld, 1992). Cohen and Huffman (2007) find that 
this effect is larger if women occupy relatively high-status positions. They conclude that the mere 
representation of women in management is not sufficient for achieving equality in pay, but that it 
is also dependent upon the hierarchical position of female managers. Lower wages in case of a 
female supervisor does not need to be limited to non-managerial workers. Ostroff and Atwater 
(2003) find that having one or more female supervisors is related to lower pay for managers. 
In the present study we examine the effect of the direct relation between subordinates and 
supervisors of (dis)similar sex and wages of female and male workers. The European Working 
Conditions Survey offers the opportunity to link managers and workers at the organizational 
level. We take into account the hierarchical position of managers by investigating the wage 
formation process of non-managerial and managerial workers. Furthermore, our focus is on the 
role of the direct boss or supervisor, which is in line with the assumption that gender wage gaps 
are more affected by the sex composition of close supervisors rather than that of more 
hierarchically distant managers (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003; Hunt and von Restorff, 2004)
6
. 
Studies investigating the effects of supervisors on wages of subordinates should be designed in a 
way that workers and supervisors are as closely linked as possible (Cohen and Huffman, 2007, 
p.685)
7
. 
3. Data and Method 
We use the Fourth European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), collected by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. This survey contains 
detailed background information on individual workers. The statistical population includes all 
persons aged 15 or over, who are either employed or self-employed, and whose country of 
residence is one of the EU or Acceding, Candidate and EEA countries. The target number of 
interviews was 1,000 in each country, with the exception of smaller countries where the target 
was 600 interviews (Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, Luxembourg). The sampling procedure is 
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described in a report of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (2007)
8
. As we are interested in wage formation in employment relationships, we 
exclude the self-employed from our analysis. 
The starting point of the analysis is essentially an extension of the Mincer approach in empirical 
labor economics (cf. Mincer, 1974). In these Mincer equations, the logarithm of the wage of a 
worker is explained from the worker‟s educational attainment and labor market experience, as 
well as several background characteristics such as gender, type of labor contract (e.g., full-time 
or part-time, fixed term or tenure), and sector of economic activity. 
The dependent variable is the income of the employee. In the EWCS, income data are retrieved 
by asking respondents to report their usual monthly earnings from their main paid job as a 
position on a 10-point scale corresponding to the 10 income deciles in each country. Note that 
this is a limitation of our study, because ideally we would use hourly wages as the dependent 
variable. Because the dependent variable is an ordinal variable, we use an ordered logit model to 
estimate the Mincer regressions. The general form of the ordered logit model is: 
(1)  iii Xw  )(logit  
where 1iw  if the respondent‟s income is in the first income decile, 2iw  if the respondent‟s 
income is in the second income decile, etc. X is a vector of explanatory variables, discussed 
hereafter.  
 
Group interactions are studied by including the proportion of females in a particular sector (based 
on NACE classification) and in a particular occupational level (based on ISCO classification). 
Table 1a reports the proportion of female employees per sector and Table 1b shows the fraction 
of female employees per occupation level. These proportions all apply to the EU level
9
 . 
 
<Table 1a here> 
 
<Table 1b here> 
 
Table 1a shows that predominantly female sectors for non-managerial workers include wholesale 
and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, financial intermediation, and education and health. 
Construction is a typically male sector. The second column shows the proportion of women 
among the supervisors of non-managerial workers
10
. In all sectors the fraction of female 
supervisors is lower than the fraction of female workers. The highest proportion of female 
supervisors is found in education and health, where female supervisors even outnumber male 
supervisors. It should be noted though that almost 80 percent of non-managerial workers in this 
sector is female. Hence, the pool of talent from which supervisors are selected is predominantly 
female. The fraction of female managers per sector is reported in the third column. We see that 
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 These numbers are calculated on the basis of the question: “Is your immediate boss a man or a woman?”. 
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the proportion of female managers is somewhat higher than the fraction of female supervisors. 
This can be attributed to the fact that not all managers have a supervisory role (e.g., account 
managers). The final column shows the proportion of women among the supervisors of 
managerial workers, which gives an indication of the representation of women in senior 
management positions. 
Table 1b shows the representation of women across occupational levels. Predominantly female 
occupations among non-managerial workers include professionals, technicians and associate 
professionals, clerks and service workers, and shop and market sales workers. The female 
representation among managerial workers is in general lower than in the case of non-managerial 
workers, but the allocation across sectors is roughly comparable. Relatively low proportions of 
women are found among craft and related trades workers as well as in plant and machine 
operators and assemblers. 
Table 2 presents the share of workers with female supervisors by sex and hierarchical level (non-
managerial versus managerial). The table shows that only a small percentage of the male workers 
has a female supervisor: this is true for 12 percent of the non-managerial workers and 9 percent 
of the managerial workers. Women in non-managerial positions are about equally likely to have a 
female or mall boss, while women in management more often have a male boss. 
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
Because managerial power of the superiors will depend on their level in the hierarchy, we will 
investigate direct interactions between subordinate and superior for non-managerial and 
managerial workers separately. Superiors in the latter group are often more senior. For the group 
of managerial workers, we distinguish between supervisors who supervise more than 10 workers 
and those who supervise less than 10 workers.  
In addition to the share of women per sector and occupation, we include a range of control 
variables in the analysis. These are factors usually taken into account in the labor economics 
literature. An overview and description of these variables is provided in Table 3. We include 
schooling dummy variables based on the ISCED classification. Training is included as a dummy 
based on the question whether the employee has undergone some form of training paid for by the 
employer in the past 12 months. We also take into account the extent to which a worker‟s human 
capital is used effectively. To that end, we include an over-schooling dummy with value „1‟ for 
individuals who have the skills to cope with more demanding duties and „0‟ otherwise. Similarly, 
we include a dummy capturing under-schooling with value „1‟ for employees who need further 
training to cope well with their duties and „0‟ otherwise. We include linear and squared variables 
for labor market experience and firm experience to control for possible concavity in the 
relationship between experience and earnings. We distinguish between workers with different 
labor contracts, i.e., tenured workers, workers with a fixed term contract, workers from 
employment agencies, and interns. As the income data refer to monthly earnings, we discriminate 
between full-time and part-time workers and include the number of hours worked per week. The 
combination of work and private life is captured by a dummy with value „1‟ if there are no 
difficulties combining these responsibilities and „0‟ otherwise11. Wage formation processes may 
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be affected by the size of the firm. To take into account potential firm size effects, we include 
dummies capturing seven different size classes. We also include a private sector dummy. Finally, 
we include country, sector (NACE) and occupation (ISCO) dummies.  
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
Table 4 shows that, on average, employees working for women earn lower monthly incomes. 
Moreover, the characteristics of workers appear to differ with the sex of the supervisor. By and 
large, employees working for a female supervisor (as compared to a male supervisor) are better 
educated, participate more in training, have somewhat less work and firm experience, they work 
less often in the private sector, and more often work part-time and less hours per week. This 
holds for workers in both non-managerial and managerial workers. 
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
Table 5 presents a further decomposition by gender to find out whether the characteristics of 
female and male workers are related to the sex of the supervisor. Table 5 highlights important 
income differences across the various combinations. Male workers who work for a male boss 
have the highest monthly incomes (their expected income decile is 6.24 for non-managerial 
workers and 7.94 for managerial workers). Women who work for a male supervisor earn less, but 
more than they would earn in case of a female superior. Men also earn lower incomes when 
working for a woman, but more than women who work for a female boss. These differences are 
striking and hold for both managerial and non-managerial workers. Inspection of background 
characteristics reveals some interesting facts. Compared to men, women with male supervisors 
more frequently have a first level tertiary education degree (ISCED5). Reversely, 38 percent of 
the men with female supervisors have a first level university degree, compared to 29 percent of 
the women. For managerial workers these percentages amount to 49 and 39 percent, respectively. 
Access to training for men and women is relatively similar. Women are much more likely to 
work part-time than men, and both men and women work more often part-time when their 
superior is female. 
 
<Table 5 here> 
4. Results 
To investigate the extent to which the observed income differences (in Tables 4 and 5) are 
attributable to worker characteristics, in this section we estimate individual monthly incomes 
while controlling for differences in characteristics across workers. Table 6 presents the results of 
the ordered logit estimations of Equation (1) for non-managerial workers, i.e., workers who have 
no supervisory role
12
.
 
Estimates are presented for the total sample (first column) as well as for 
                                                                                                                                                              
or “well”. The EWCS also contains data on household composition (partner and children). We did not include these 
data in our baseline model as this would seriously reduce the number of observations available for the regression 
analysis. A sensitivity analysis shows that our results would not change when we would include household 
composition in the analysis. 
12
 We also estimated an ordered probit model. The results of the probit and logit estimations of Equation (1) are quite 
similar. 
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men and women separately (second and third column, respectively). For ease of presentation and 
interpretation the coefficients of the control variables are not reported in Table 6. The signs and 
order of magnitudes of these coefficients are as expected.
13
 
 
<Table 6 here> 
 
The first row of Table 6 shows that „female sectors‟ (NACE sectors with a large proportion of 
female workers) pay less, though a statistically significant coefficient (at 5%-level) is only found 
for the total sample
14
. The second row shows that „female occupations‟ (ISCO occupations with a 
stronger representation of female workers) pay less. The latter result holds when the regression 
model is estimated for male and female workers separately. The third row presents the „classical‟ 
gender effect (for the total sample), showing that, even when controlling for differences in 
background characteristics, women earn substantially lower wages than men. The estimated 
coefficient shows that the gender pay gap is approximately a full income decile.  
The fourth row shows the role of the superior‟s gender. A strong negative income effect is found 
for employees with a female supervisor. This holds for the total group, as well as for men and 
women separately. We can only speculate about the reasons behind this effect. Are female 
supervisors less successful in mobilizing resources within the company, thereby lowering 
individual and team productivity (Hunt and von Restorff, 2004)? Are they more junior than male 
bosses? Are female bosses themselves confronted with gender pay discrimination, forcing them 
to pay less to their subordinates to protect the wage premium for managerial tasks? Or are they 
simply stingier? We will leave this issue for future work, though below we will present evidence 
that female managers are also at a pay disadvantage. 
Interestingly, the negative effect of having a female boss on wages is smaller for women than for 
men. This is confirmed by the positive interaction effect of gender of the employee with gender 
of the superior in the fourth row. This effect tells us that the wages of men „suffer‟ more from 
having a female superior than women‟s wages. This confirms the discrimination hypothesis, but 
also reveals another interesting issue. Female workers seem confronted with the following trade-
off. If they work for a male boss, they will receive a higher wage, but they have to accept a larger 
gender pay gap. If they work for a female boss, gender discrimination is smaller but they are 
offered a lower salary. This trade-off may be referred to as a „discrimination-for-pay‟ effect. 
Female workers can avoid part of the discrimination against them by working for a woman and 
accepting lower pay. And when they face stronger discrimination in the situation of a male 
supervisor, they are „bribed‟ by a higher salary. In other words, higher wages come at a price. 
There may however be other clarifications. For example, an alternative yet provocative 
explanation would be that women have less negotiating power in the wage bargaining process 
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is driven by the earlier mentioned correlations. When including only the proportion of female superiors, no 
significant relationship is found. We proceed by including only the representation of female workers, leaving the 
representation of women in management and its influence on wage formation processes for further research. 
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with a male supervisor, as their outside option (working for a female boss) puts them at a double 
disadvantage. Our findings are in line with those of Hunt and von Restorff (2004). They find that, 
after controlling for relevant background characteristics, subordinates of female supervisors earn 
less than the subordinates of male supervisors in Germany. Our study shows that this finding also 
holds in an international setting. 
The results for managerial workers (who supervise at least one other worker), reported in Table 
7, are different from those for non-managerial workers. Managerial wages are not systematically 
related to the proportion of females per sector or occupation.  
Again, we find lower wages for women, though the coefficient is somewhat smaller than for the 
group of non-managerial employees. Remarkably, only female managers with a female superior 
earn less. We do not find a negative income effect for male managers with a female supervisor. 
The interaction term of gender of the employee with gender of the superior is negative. For some 
reason, female managers with a female superior seem to be at a double disadvantage in terms of 
pay. This may be a reflection of the so-called „queen bee‟ effect, where women feel threatened by 
other women who have ambitions to climb the organizational ladder and may obstruct their 
progress. Obviously, this is speculation, and we should be careful in drawing conclusions from 
this analysis, in particular since the sample sizes are much smaller for the group of managerial 
workers. 
 
<Table 7 here> 
5. Extensions 
The basic analysis as presented in the previous section can be extended in various ways. We do 
this to study the robustness of our findings, and to inspect in more detail some of the mechanisms 
at work. In this section we present the results from various sensitivity checks and we discuss the 
outcomes of the direct social interactions between subordinate and immediate supervisor in 
greater detail. 
First, we investigate whether discriminatory practices are related to firm size. Wages tend to 
increase with firm size (also after controlling for important observed characteristics of workers). 
What happens to the gender pay gap when firm size increases? We do not have an a priori 
expectation of the sign of this relationship. On the one hand, it may be argued that social ties are 
stronger in small firms than in larger companies, possibly leading to less discriminatory practices 
within small organisations. In addition, career prospects are often more limited in smaller firms, 
which may reduce the desire to discriminate against a specific group to promote ones‟ own 
career. Careers can be seen as tournaments in which performance is assessed relative to others 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and „ego bashing‟ is sometimes used in battles for dominance 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). On the other hand, public accountability and corporate social 
responsibility policies may be more widespread in larger firms, which may limit discriminatory 
practices. To empirically investigate the role of firm size in the wage setting process, we have 
estimated our model for firms with 2-49 employees and firms with 50 or more employees, 
separately. Results for non-managerial and managerial workers are shown in Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively. For non-managerial workers, the results are relatively similar for firms with less 
than 50 employees and those with 50 and more employees. This suggests that the aforementioned 
mechanisms are very weak, or that they cancel out. It should be noted that we have few firms 
 10 
with 500+ employees and the category „firms with 50 or more employees‟ mainly contains 
SMEs. Therefore, the presented sensitivity check mainly compares small firms with medium-
sized companies. Nevertheless, firm size does not appear to explain pay differences of non-
managerial workers. Results for managerial workers are presented in Table 9. The key result here 
is the confirmation of the significantly negative interaction term of female employee with female 
superior for firms with less than 50 employees. This interaction term is not significant for the 
larger firms
15
.  
A second issue is that of choosing an appropriate group when investigating group interactions. In 
our analysis we included the proportion of female workers per NACE code (country pairs) and 
per ISCO level (country pairs). Cohen and Huffman (2007) define the relevant group as the local 
labour market, for instance at the city level. Although the EWCS includes NUTS 2 data, sample 
size considerations made us decide to use only national averages for the proportions of females 
per ISCO and NACE codes. 
By examining the influence of sex similarity, we are (perhaps somewhat implicitly) testing for 
the role of networks. We can explore this issue in more detail by looking at various forms of 
contacts between employee and supervisor. The EWCS contains some questions that give insight 
into the frequency and nature of such contacts. Relevant questions include the following: “Had a 
frank discussion with your boss about your work performance?”; “Been consulted about changes 
in the organisation of work and/or your working conditions?” and “Discussed work-related 
problems with your boss?”. Table 10 shows the fraction of respondents answering “yes” to these 
questions. The table shows that (i) contacts are more frequent when employees have a female 
superior, and (ii) for both groups of superiors (male and female), female workers have somewhat 
less contact with their boss than male workers: for example, 60 percent of non-managerial male 
employees with a female superior indicate that they were consulted about organisational change 
against 55 percent of female employees. For managerial workers these percentages amount to 74 
and 70 percent, respectively. To the extent that these questions capture access to (in)formal 
networks within organisations, we find some support for a gender bias, but further research is 
needed. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies gender pay differentials in the EU. In addition to the factors proposed in the 
labor economics literature, we draw upon alternative explanations behind gender pay differences. 
In particular, we examine the importance of horizontal segregation effects by taking into account 
the proportion of females working in a particular sector. It would be expected from social bias 
theory that a larger representation of women would bring down the gender pay gap. Our results 
provide, at best, only weak evidence in support of the social bias theory. 
Secondly, we allow for the effects of vertical segregation by looking at direct interactions 
between worker and superior, and whether sex composition in management matters. We find 
                                                 
15 
An alternative strategy would be to run regressions where only some regression coefficients are allowed to vary 
across different firm size categories. This could be done by creating a dummy variable with value „1‟ if the company 
employs less than 50 workers and zero otherwise, and subsequently interacting this dummy with the gender variables 
(i.e., „female employee‟, „female superior‟, „female employee*female superior‟). For non-managerial workers these 
interaction terms are insignificant in all cases (results are not reported), as already expected from the results in Table 
8. A similar conclusion follows from regressions along these lines for the managerial workers. 
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relatively strong effects for subordinate-superior interactions. For the group of non-managerial 
workers evidence points at a „discrimination-for-pay‟ effect. While the gender wage gap is 
smaller when worker and superior are of the same sex, teams working for a female boss receive 
lower wages. That is, women working for a male boss receive a better wage (as compared to a 
situation where they would have a female boss), but are confronted with a larger gender pay gap. 
Thus, sex similarity between worker and boss plays a role in the wage formation process, where 
female bosses pay lower wages, and female workers seem to face a trade-off between pay levels 
and the strength of gender discrimination. Note that working for a male or female boss is not 
necessarily a deliberate choice. Also, (female) workers may simply not be aware of the existence 
of wage discrimination within the organization, let alone react to it and switch between jobs and 
managers. However, it is now common knowledge that female jobs pay less and women are still 
choosing to work in female dominated sectors. But even if workers would be aware of the gender 
pay gap, this does not mean that they are also willing and able to take on another job. First of all, 
there may not be similar jobs available within the organization, sector or region (in particular in 
times of economic adversity) and, secondly, the lower paid jobs may have other advantages that 
compensate for the lower wage, e.g., female managers are often strong in their social skills and 
motivating their employees, leading to a pleasant, often non-competitive, work environment.  
What implications for policy can be drawn from this analysis? The main message is that on top 
of economic explanations that draw on the human capital literature, we can gain additional 
insights in the phenomenon of the gender wage gap by looking at the sociological literature and, 
more specifically, by focusing on the importance of sex similarity of worker and supervisor in 
wage setting processes as well as differences in wage outcomes for team members with a male or 
a female supervisor.  
We should be careful interpreting the results for several reasons. First, though the obvious 
advantage of the EWCS is that it is an international dataset covering all EU countries as well as 
the Acceding, Candidate and EEA countries, the number of observations per country is relatively 
small. Second, the income data are not very precise, as only income deciles are available. Third, 
we have no information about productivity or other performance indicators that would enable us 
to further analyze whether salary differences in groups led by male or female supervisors are 
related to efficiency factors or whether there are other forces at work. 
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Tables 
 
 Table 1a: Proportion of female employees per sector (NACE) 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Fraction female 
workers 
Fraction female 
supervisors 
Fraction female 
managers 
Fraction female 
supervisors 
Agriculture and 
fishing 
0.37 0.16 0.28 0.15 
Manufacture and 
mining 
0.42 0.20 0.26 0.11 
Electricity, gas 
and water supply 
0.29 0.16 0.19 0.08 
Construction 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.04 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
0.59 0.29 0.48 0.23 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
0.65 0.27 0.48 0.20 
Transport and 
communication 
0.34 0.19 0.30 0.13 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.61 0.30 0.30 0.15 
Real estate 0.55 0.26 0.30 0.15 
Public 
administration 
and defence 
0.51 0.30 0.37 0.19 
Education and 
health 
0.79 0.58 0.71 0.50 
Note: Own calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. 
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 Table 1b: Proportion of female employees per occupation level (ISCO) 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Fraction female 
workers 
Fraction female 
supervisors 
Fraction female 
managers 
Fraction female 
supervisors 
Legislators, 
senior officials 
and managers 
0.48 0.26 0.36 0.16 
Professionals 0.65 0.43 0.44 0.26 
Technicians and 
associate 
professionals 
0.66 0.44 0.49 0.30 
Clerks 0.74 0.34 0.56 0.24 
Service workers 
and shop and 
market sales 
workers 
0.66 0.41 0.46 0.26 
Skilled 
agricultural and 
fishery workers 
0.39 0.18 0.21 0.11 
Craft and related 
trades workers 
0.22 0.13 0.12 0.05 
Plant and 
machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
0.24 0.15 0.14 0.09 
Elementary 
occupations 
0.56 0.31 0.39 0.25 
Armed forces 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Note: Own calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. 
 
 
Table 2: Share of workers with female supervisors, by sex and hierarchical level 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Men Women Men Women 
Supervisor male 88.0% 51.3% 91.0% 59.8% 
Supervisor 
female 
12.0% 48.7% 9.0% 40.2% 
Observations 6,113 7,271 1,548 998 
Note: Own calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. 
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Table 3: Variable descriptions 
Name of variable Description 
Income Monthly earnings on 10-point scale corresponding with the 10 income deciles in each country 
%FemWorkers_NACE Proportion of female workers per sector and country  
%FemSupervisors_NACE Proportion of female supervisors per sector and country 
%FemWorkers_ISCO Proportion of female workers per occupation level and country  
%FemSupervisors_ISCO Proportion of female supervisors per occupation level and country 
Female Sex of the worker (1=female) 
FemaleBoss Sex of the supervisor (1=female) 
Supervise>10 Dummy variable with value „1‟ if respondent supervises more than 10 people 
Training Did the employee have some form of training over the past 12 months? (1=yes) a 
Schooling (ISCED codes)  
No schooling Pre-primary education 
ISCED1 Primary education 
ISCED2 Lower secondary education 
ISCED3 Upper secondary education 
ISCED4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
ISCED5 First level tertiary education 
ISCED6 Advanced level tertiary education 
OverSchool Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent has the skills to cope with more demanding duties 
UnderSchool Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent needs further training to cope with his/her duties 
LaborExperience Number of years in paid employment since finishing full-time education 
FirmExperience Number of years in this company or organization 
Indefinite Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent has a permanent contract 
FixedTerm Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent has a fixed term contract 
EmplAgency Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent has a contract through an employment agency 
Intern Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent takes part in an apprenticeship or training scheme 
Parttime Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent works part-time 
Hours Number of hours worked per week in main paid job 
Combi Dummy with value „1‟ if respondent feels that working hours fit in with family or social 
commitments outside work 
Private Dummy with value „1‟ if individual works in the private sector, and value „0‟ for all other 
sectors (i.e., public sector, private-public organization, non-for-profit sector) 
FirmSize Seven dummies per size class: 2-4; 5-9; 10-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499;  over 500 employees 
Sector (NACE codes)  
NACE1 Agriculture and fishing 
NACE2 Manufacturing and mining 
NACE3 Electricity, gas and water supply 
NACE4 Construction 
NACE5 Wholesale and retail trade 
NACE6 Hotels and restaurants 
NACE7 Transport and communication 
NACE8 Financial intermediation 
NACE9 Real estate 
NACE10 Public administration and defence 
NACE11 Education and health 
Occupation (ISCO codes) Ten dummies: managers; professionals; technicians & associated professionals; clerical 
support workers; service and sales workers; skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers; 
craft and related trades workers; plant and machine operators & assemblers; elementary 
occupations; armed forces occupations 
a This includes on-the-job training (by co-workers and supervisors), on-site training and learning (e.g., self-learning, on-line tutorials) and other 
forms mentioned by the respondent.   
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Table 4: Characteristics of workers by sex of the supervisor 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
Monthly income 5.69 4.86 7.58 6.50 
Fraction female 
workers in sector 
0.49 0.66 0.34 0.57 
Fraction female 
supervisors in 
sector 
0.26 0.45 0.16 0.42 
Fraction female 
workers in 
occupation level 
0.49 0.65 0.36 0.51 
Fraction female 
supervisors in 
occupation level 
0.28 0.41 0.17 0.35 
No schooling 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ISCED1 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.01 
ISCED2 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.07 
ISCED3 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.27 
ISCED4 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.18 
ISCED5 0.21 0.31 0.34 0.41 
ISCED6 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Training 0.32 0.40 0.51 0.57 
Underschooling 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.16 
Overschooling 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.33 
Labor market 
Experience 
18.44 17.98 21.06 20.17 
Firm experience 9.46 9.42 12.39 12.24 
Fixed term 
contract 
0.11 0.13 0.06 0.07 
Employment 
agency 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Intern 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Part-time 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.13 
Combination 
work and private 
life 
0.81 0.82 0.78 0.80 
Hours 39.25 36.38 42.44 38.86 
Private sector 0.66 0.42 0.66 0.44 
Supervise>10   0.30 0.28 
Observations 9,110 4,274 2,006 540 
Note: Own calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. 
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Table 5: Characteristics of workers by sex of the supervisor, by sex of the workers, and by 
hierarchical level 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Monthly 
income 
6.24 4.90 5.99 4.62 7.94 6.74 7.86 6.03 
Fraction female 
workers in 
sector 
0.42 0.59 0.59 0.68 0.27 0.51 0.41 0.62 
Fraction female 
supervisors in 
sector 
0.21 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.13 0.22 0.37 0.44 
Fraction female 
workers in 
occupation 
level 
0.40 0.63 0.56 0.67 0.30 0.50 0.39 0.56 
Fraction female 
supervisors in 
occupation 
level 
0.23 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.36 
No schooling 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 
ISCED1 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 
ISCED2 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
ISCED3 0.47 0.42 0.32 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.25 0.28 
ISCED4 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.20 
ISCED5 0.17 0.28 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.49 0.39 
ISCED6 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Training 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.40 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.58 
Underschooling 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 
Overschooling 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.33 
Labor market 
Experience 
19.20 17.34 17.87 18.00 21.65 19.67 20.44 20.08 
Firm 
experience 
9.74 9.05 9.77 9.34 12.84 11.35 11.72 12.42 
Fixed term 
contract 
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Employment 
agency 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Intern 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0 0.00 
Part-time 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.15 
Combination 
work and 
private life 
0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.79 0.73 0.82 
Hours 41.28 36.32 38.40 35.96 43.71 39.47 41.95 37.79 
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Private sector 0.71 0.59 0.46 0.41 0.69 0.57 0.53 0.41 
Supervise>10     0.32 0.26 0.37 0.25 
Observations 5,382 3,728 731 3,543 1,409 597 139 401 
Note: Own calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. 
 
Table 6: Impact of group and direct interactions for wage formation for non-managerial 
workers in the EU, ordered logit estimations 
 Total Male Female 
NACE proportion of 
female workers 
-0.409** 
(0.187) 
-0.388 
(0.258) 
-0.247 
(0.284) 
ISCO proportion of 
female workers  
-0.605*** 
(0.148) 
-0.600*** 
(0.215) 
-0.512** 
(0.217) 
Female employee -1.076*** 
(0.045) 
  
Female superior -0.571*** 
(0.079) 
-0.467*** 
(0.081) 
-0.209*** 
(0.045) 
Female employee × 
female superior 
0.375*** 
(0.088) 
  
Observations 13,384 6,113 7,271 
Pseudo R squared 0.16 0.14 0.17 
Log pseudolikelihood -25707.8 -11917.4 -13649.9 
Note: Robust standard errors (corrected for clustering of observations within countries) are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%-, 5%, and 1%-level. A set of control 
variables as described in the main text is included. 
 
Table 7: Impact of group and direct interactions for wage formation for managerial 
workers in the EU, ordered logit estimations 
 Total Male Female 
NACE proportion of 
female workers 
0.011 
(0.261) 
-0.032 
(0.389) 
-0.056 
(0.458) 
ISCO proportion of 
female workers  
-0.160 
(0.256) 
0.062 
(0.363) 
-0.576 
(0.432) 
Female employee -0.965*** 
(0.110) 
  
Female superior -0.108 
(0.181) 
-0.065 
(0.191) 
-0.509*** 
(0.136) 
Female employee × 
female superior 
-0.376* 
(0.214) 
  
Observations 2,546 1,548 998 
Pseudo R squared 0.18 0.16 0.19 
Log pseudolikelihood -4353.9 -2471.6 -1815.0 
Note: Robust standard errors (corrected for clustering of observations within countries) are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%-, 5%, and 1%-level. A set of control 
variables as described in the main text is included. 
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Table 8: Impact of group and direct interactions for wage formation for non-managerial 
workers in the EU, ordered logit estimations per firm size class  
 Firms with 2-49 employees Firms with 50 employees and more 
 Total Male Female Total Male Female 
NACE 
proportion of 
female workers 
-0.517** 
(0.234) 
-0.399 
(0.336) 
-0.501 
(0.349) 
-0.335 
(0.330) 
-0.568 
(0.435) 
0.115 
(0.527) 
ISCO proportion 
of female 
workers  
-0.500*** 
(0.188) 
-0.468* 
(0.271) 
-0.345 
(0.283) 
-0.800*** 
(0.243) 
-0.917** 
(0.362) 
-0.787** 
(0.353) 
Female 
employee 
-1.049*** 
(0.058) 
  -1.109*** 
(0.072) 
  
Female superior -0.575*** 
(0.105) 
-0.449*** 
(0.111) 
-0.219*** 
(0.057) 
-0.524*** 
(0.124) 
-0.439*** 
(0.130) 
-0.231*** 
(0.076) 
Female 
employee × 
female superior 
0.393*** 
(0.116) 
  0.295** 
(0.141) 
  
Observations 8,253 3,564 4,689 5,131 2,549 2,582 
Pseudo R 
squared 
0.16 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-15813.4 -7064.3 -8645.0 -9823.0 -4802.4 -4944.8 
Note: Robust standard errors (corrected for clustering of observations within countries) are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%-, 5%, and 1%-level. A set of control 
variables as described in the main text is included. 
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Table 9: Impact of group and direct interactions for wage formation for managerial 
workers in the EU, ordered logit estimations per firm size class  
 Firms with 2-49 employees Firms with 50 employees and more 
 Total Male Female Total Male Female 
NACE 
proportion of 
female workers 
0.195 
(0.337) 
0.242 
(0.550) 
-0.144 
(0.593) 
-0.274 
(0.451) 
-0.680 
(0.620) 
0.263 
(0.873) 
ISCO proportion 
of female 
workers  
-0.512 
(0.376) 
-0.452 
(0.524) 
-0.592 
(0.653) 
0.101 
(0.406) 
0.550 
(0.598) 
-0.787 
(0.752) 
Female 
employee 
-0.997*** 
(0.158) 
  -0.843*** 
(0.165) 
  
Female superior 0.054 
(0.290) 
0.029 
(0.306) 
-0.542*** 
(0.182) 
-0.304 
(0.260) 
-0.139 
(0.278) 
-0.638*** 
(0.237) 
Female 
employee × 
female superior 
-0.572* 
(0.329) 
  -0.309 
(0.319) 
  
Observations 1,379 770 609 1,167 778 389 
Pseudo R 
squared 
0.17 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.24 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2481.7 -1303.5 -1125.3 -1824.7 -1123.7 -642.2 
Note: Robust standard errors (corrected for clustering of observations within countries) are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%-, 5%, and 1%-level. A set of control 
variables as described in the main text is included. 
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Table 10: Communication intensity between workers and their superiors 
 Non-managerial workers Managerial workers 
 Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
Supervisor male Supervisor 
female 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Had a frank 
discussion with 
your boss about 
your work 
performance 
54% 52% 60% 57% 69% 70% 74% 67% 
Been consulted 
about changes in 
the organisation 
of work and / or 
your working 
conditions? 
48% 51% 60% 55% 71% 68% 74% 70% 
Discussed work-
related problems 
with your boss? 
67% 66% 72% 69% 83% 83% 83% 80% 
Observations 5,382 3,728 731 3,543 1,409 597 139 401 
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